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Federal Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a 
Domestic Violence Exception To Exclusive 
Legislative Jurisdiction 
Michael J. Malinowski 
INTRODUCTION 
Diane Cobb, a member of the United States Armed Forces, resides and 
works in a federal enclave.1 Solely because of this, questions of law arose as 
to whether a Massachusetts state court could issue a restraining order to protect 
her and her infant child from an abusive and dangerous civilian husband,2 and 
whether such a state-generated order even would be enforceable in a federal 
enclave.3 
The jurisdiction of federal courts does not reach into domestic relations.4 
I. Cobb. v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d J 161 (1989). Federal enclaves are pockets of federally­
owned property within states, over which the federal government often holds exclusive legislative jurisdic­
tion. Besides serving as military installations, federal enclaves have been established to serve as national 
parks, nuclear power plants, post offices, and the nation's capital. 
Throughout this Note, "federal enclave" refers to military bases under exclusive federal legislative 
jurisdiction. Within the United States, there are 871 military installations with 2,774, 100 soldiers and 
employees. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , LIST OF MU..ITARY INSTALLATIONS, At.rrHORJZED fUU..-TiME 
ASSIGNED PERSONNEL (INCLUDING FY 1987). This figure, however, does not include the family members 
of these personnel. In fact, 51 % of enlisted service people and 40% of officers have children under six years 
of age. Griffith, Research Triangle Institute, Description of Spouses of Officers and Enlisted Personnel in 
the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985 (1986) (report based on 1985 DoD surveys of officers, enlisted personnel, 
and military spouses); see also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFF.NSE, DEFENSE '87 ALMANAC 30, 
33 (Sept.-Oct. 1987). 
. 2. "In the six months preceding the filing of the complaint (by Diane Cobb], the defendant pushed [her], 
kicked her, threw a knife at her and threw a brick through her car windshield while she sat in the car." Brief 
and Appendix of Plaintiff/Appellee Diane Cobb at 4, Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (1989) 
(No. SJC-5039) [hereinafter Plaintiff Brief]. 
3. The author selected the case of Cobb v. Cobb for discussion, not only because it triggered an amicus 
brief from the United States Department of Justice on behalf of the Department of the Army, but also 
?
ecause it illustrates the identifiable effect of the enclave problem-"the recurring question of what relief 
is available from state courts to residents of military installations within state boundaries who suffer domestic 
abuse." Brief of Amicus Curiae the Department of the Army in Support of Appellee Diane Cobb at 6, Cobb 
v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 ( No. SJC-5039) [hereinafter Army Brief). Empirical measurement 
of �he potential effects of this problem-i.e., the extent to which jurisdictionally unsure state courts refuse 
to issue such orders and the extent to which such orders, once issued, are not enforced by base command­
ers-is beyond the scope of this Note. 
4. See infra note 44 and accompanying text; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) ("'The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
States and not to the laws of the United States."') (quoting In Re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)); 
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Yet, the extent to which the victims of domestic violence5 who reside on 
federal enclaves can import state law relief onto these islands of federal juris­
diction is not clear. 
The exclusive legislation clause,6 supremacy clause,7 and property clauses 
empower the federal government and its agents to insure that federal interests 
are served on government enclaves. What constitutes a "federal interest" is, to 
a large extent, left to the discretion of military commanders.9 Therefore, a 
commander may shield military personnel from a state regulation or court order 
that interferes with the performance of assigned duties-for example, a tempo­
rary restraining order (TRO) issued by a state court to keep an abusive soldier 
away from his10 enclave residence.11 
see also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899). For a full discussion of the domestic relations exception 
to federal law in light of federal-state jurisdiction, see Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction 
and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1984): 
Three theories support the exception by suggesting that federal courts historically lacked power 
to grant divorces, award alimony, and determine child custody because: (i) diversity jurisdiction 
originally did not extend to these suits; (ii) the jurisdiction of article m courts was never intended 
to extend to these matters; and (iii) such issues are reserved to the states through the (T]enth 
Amendment. 
5. "Domestic violence" refers to violence occurring within a household or between members of a 
household, "violence" meaning: 
Unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage 
or fury. Physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against 
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. The exertion of any physical force 
so as to injure, damage or abuse. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 570 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
6. U.S . CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ( Congress shall have the power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation 
in all Cases whatsoever ... over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which 
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Build· 
ings."). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof .. . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of the State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 
Note that, although the United States cannot unilaterally acquire federal jurisdiction over a state's land 
without the consent of that state's legislature, and the state legislature may reserve some rights (to serve 
process, for example), the supremacy clause prohibits a state reservation from being "inconsistent with the 
free and effective use" of the land for federal purposes. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 
539 ( 1885) (supremacy requires nonapplicability of state laws interfering with ownership and use of � 
property by federal government); see infra text accompanying notes 17-22 (discussing concept of exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction more fully). It follows that the effect of supremacy is to grant immunity to distinctly 
federal activities. 
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ( .. fhe Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .. ·.�).See 
American Fed. of Gov. Employees v. F. L. R.A., 802 F.2d 1159, 1163 (1986) (holding California's ng�t � 
license drivers not infringed by naval weapons station's suspension of driving privileges on stations 
property, on grounds that "[t]he federal government may control its property free from regulation by the 
states unless Congress declares that the property is subject to state regulation"). 
9. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
10. Throughout this Note, masculine pronouns are used to refer to abusers, while feminine pro�u.
ns 
are used to refer to their victims. This division most accurately parallels the fact patterns of the maJonty 
of reported domestic violence cases. 
11. For discussion of the constitutional provisions granting interference immunity to federal �te�� 
see Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C.L. REV. 617 (1985) (constituUO. 
analysis regarding relevant clauses); see also Altieri, Federal Enclaves: The Impact of Exclusive Legistanve 
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The issue of enforcement, however, may never arise since state courts, 
afraid of stepping beyond their jurisdiction, might hesitate to issue such or­
ders.12 The ironic result of this apprehension is that, even when the military's 
interests are aligned with those of the victim, military interests m ay be frustrat­
ed: when the abuser is a civilian outside of the military's jurisdiction (and the 
victim of domestic violence is a soldier such as Diane Cobb), the military might 
be impotent to address the situation without a state court order.13 
Congress should carve a domestic violence exception out of the exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction of federal enclaves so that all enclave domestic violence 
victims are assured legal recourse. 14 In the absence of a congressional re­
sponse, courts should continue to respond to domestic violence actions through 
a modified doctrine of noninterference. Presently, this doctrine utilizes a 
presumption in favor of applying state law in the area of domestic relations, 
but only to the extent that state law does not conflict with federal law and 
Jur isdiction Upon Civil Litigation, 72 MIL. L. REV. 55, 58 (1976) ("It clearly appears throughout the early 
legislative history that this idea of prevention of state interference with governmental activities was the 
primary concern of the framers in considering the need for exclusive jurisdiction."); Engdahl, Federalism 
and Energy: State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976) (interpretation 
of property clause regarding federal land). 
12. Diane Cobb was issued a temporary restraining order by the Ayer District Court on December 6, 
1988, but the trial court issuing the order also reported two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court: (i) Does 
a Massachusetts trial court lack the power to issue a restraining order for a member of the United States 
Armed Forces who resides and works on a military enclave, and, (ii) once issued, is such an order legally 
effective within the confines of a military enclave? See Plaintiff Brief, supra note 2, at 1. These questions 
proved important enough to generate a brief of amicus curiae from the Department of the Army. See Army 
Brief, supra note 3. 
On December 12, 1988, Diane's temporary restraining order was extended until June 11, 1989, pending 
direct appellate review of the preceding questions by the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, after noting that the Cobb case was moot because the temporary restraining order expired on its own 
terms (oral arguments were heard on September 5, 1989), avoided resolving the doctrinal confusion 
enmeshing enclave litigants (see infra text accompanying notes 23-43) by simply acknowledging a trend 
toward applying the doctrine of noninterference: "Opinions of the United States Supreme Court in more 
recent years have shown that the Constitution of the United States does not bar extension of the benefits 
and burdens of all State laws to inhabitants of land ceded to the Federal government." Cobb v. Cobb, 406 
Mass. 21, 24, 545 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (1989). The Court, applying the doctrine of noninterference, found 
that: (i) the restraining order was effective against the defendant as to his conduct off ceded land; and, (ii) 
"[i]n the absence of any indication that such an order interfered with the Federal function," the order was 
also effective against the defendant's conduct when on ceded land. Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). 
13. See infra note 62; see also Army Brief, supra note 3, at 2: "[l)f enclave residents in Mrs. Cobb's 
situation are denied access to state courts for relief, they may be left with no recourse at all since the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals does not extend to spouses, like Mr. Cobb, who reside on federal enclaves, 
but are not members of the armed forces." (citation omitted). 
14. See Note, Federal Enclaves-Through the Looking Glasr-Darkly, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 754 
(1964) (commentary supporting failed 1960's Congressional effort to codify state and agency jurisdiction 
within federal enclaves). For a general survey of the federal enclave issue, with a focus on procedural ques­
tions, see also Altieri, supra note 11. In the instance of "essential" federal functions, federal immunity also 
applies to activities conducted off enclaves, for example, Army personnel entering private property to 
retrieve downed aircraft. For a more extreme application, see Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) 
(holding state cannot constitutionally require federal employee to secure driver's permit before operating 
motor vehicle to perform federal duties). 
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military regulations, nor interfere with the federal function of the enclave.15 
This state law presumption is not enough, for as soon as a military commander 
claims that applying state law grinds against federal interest, the presumption 
dissolves. To this presumption must be added the recognition that protecting 
all victims of domestic violence is a substantial federal interest with which, 
other government interests should not interfere. 
This Note begins in Part I by establishing the federal purpose behind exclu­
sive legislative jurisdiction, and explaining how the failure of states to condition 
cession16 of their lands to the federal government left courts no clear direction 
for addressing questions regarding the private rights of enclave residents. The 
Note then presents three doctrinal approaches taken by courts to resolve the 
problem of enclave litigation and demonstrates their unpredictability. It also 
substantiates that there is, in light of this unpredictability, a potential lack of 
legal recourse for the victims of domestic violence who reside on federal 
enclaves. Part II presents the factual background of Cobb v. Cobb, a recent 
illustration of the enclave problem, and uses this case to rethink the legal 
doctrine. Part III proposes a solution that would provide greater certainty of 
legal recourse for all victims of domestic violence on federal enclaves, whether 
they be soldier or civilian, adult or child. 
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE LAW'S TREATMENT OF ENCLAVE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A. Background: Beyond the Expectation of the Framers 
The notion of distancing certain federal functions from the states in which 
these federal functions are carried out originated with the inability of 
Philadelphia's local government to maintain order during the Continental 
Congress: 
In June of 1783 the Continental Congress, meeting in Philadelphia, was 
subjected to four days of harassment by soldiers [mutineers from the 
Continental Army] demanding their pay. Although there was no physical 
violence, the proceedings were disrupted and the Congress was forced 
to leave the city. The inability of the local government to control the 
rioting was a matter of serious concern to the legislators_. 17 
15. See Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953) (often cited for viewing enclave 
as being within a state and providing arguments for extension to enclave residents of civil rights belonging 
to state citizens). 
16. Cession is "[t]he assignment, transfer, or yielding up of territory by one state or government to 
another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990). 
17. Altieri, supra note 11, at 57-58 (citations omitted); see also Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 
U.S. 525, 539 ( 1885) (stressing federal government is entitled to "free and effective use" of enclave property 
for federal purposes). 
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The Framers were concerned that their new government be protected from 
interference, but, during the state ratifying conventions, the power of exclusive 
legislation over enclave areas was questioned.18 Madison's response in The 
Federalist Papers articulated the lasting principle behind the doctrine of exclu­
sive legislative jurisdiction: the need to protect federal functions in enclave 
areas from the interference and excessive influence of any state.19 
Protecting such federal functions is what the Framers intended to do. Never 
did they intend to go so far as to rip the fabric of state law out of these federal 
pockets, for it was the "expectation of the Framers that the power of exclusive 
jurisdiction would not be strictly viewed, and that a residual state jurisdiction 
could continue within the enclave as to private matters not interfering with 
federal functions. "20 
Despite the expectation of the Framers and the fact that jurisdiction given 
is forever gone,21 states did not place conditions on cession to protect private 
rights.22 This left the law unclear and the private rights of enclave residents 
undefined. Over time, the courts have generated three distinct approaches to 
enclave-based litigation while fumbling with the private rights of enclave resi­
dents. 
B. The Three Doctrinal Approaches to Enclave Litigation23 
Conflict among various Supreme Court enclave precedents has resulted in 
three separate approaches to enclave-based litigation: the McG/inn (international 
18. Altieri, supra note 11, at 57-58 (citations omitted). 
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 273 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961): 
The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require 
that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for 
the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend to be in any degree dependent 
on a particular member of it. 
20. Altieri, supra note 11, at 60. One commentator has suggested that "[c]onstruing the clause as 
conferring a power to legislate exclusively [having the power to trump other legislative bodies with one's 
legislation} rather than an exclusive power to legislate [holding the sole power to legislate] would make 
it ample for its apparent purpose, and would comport with the earliest evidence of the drafters' intent." 
Engdahl, supra note 11, at 289. In contrast, for an intent argument that the "real" classic property clause 
theory calls for an expansive view of federal property clause power, see Gaetke, supra note l 1. 
21. A state cannot unilaterally recapture jurisdiction ceded to the Federal Government. See United States 
v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143 (1930) ("[A]fter this jurisdiction had been accepted by the United States, 
it could not be recaptured by the action of the state alone .... "); Yellowstone Park Transp. Co. v. Gallatin 
County, 31 F.2d 644, 645 (9th Cir.) ("In other words, after the date of cession, the ceded territory was as 
much without the jurisdiction of the state making that cession as was any other foreign territory, except in 
so far as jurisdiction was expressly reserved."), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929). 
22. The sole exception is Vrrginia's cession of land for the District of Columbia: 
And provided also, That the jurisdiction of the laws of this commonwealth over the persons and 
property of individuals residing within the limits of the cession aforesaid, shall not cease or determine 
until Congress, having accepted the said cession, shall, by law, provide for the government thereof, 
under their jurisdiction, in manner provided by the articles of the Constitution before recited. 
Act of Cession from the State of Virginia, D.C. CODE ANN. § I (1981). 
23. For a more thorough summary of the litigation history marking the evolution of these doctrines see Altieri, supra note 11. 
' 
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law) rule,24 the Paul rule,25 and the Howard (noninterference) rule.26 The 
McGlinn rule mandates that: "whenever political jurisdiction and legislative 
power over any territory are transferred from one . . . sovereign to another, 
the ... laws[,] which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue 
in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign."27 
According to this doctrine, when jurisdiction is transferred from a state to the 
federal government to form an enclave, the state law in existence at the time 
of the transfer becomes federal law. State statutory and common law changes 
made subsequent to the transfer, however, have no force within the enclave 
unless authorized by specific congressional legislation. 28 
The immediate problem with the McGlinn rule is the lack of nineteenth­
century statutes authorizing courts to issue modem-day remedies such as TROs. 
Nevertheless, there are some antique statutes capable of providing such re­
course. For example, in Cobb v. Cobb, Diane Cobb might have found recourse 
under an 1820 Massachusetts statute providing that, following the filing of a 
libel for divorce from the bonds of matrimony or from "bed and board,"29 a 
court is empowered to "prohibit the husband from imposing any restraint upon 
the personal liberty of the wife, during the pendency of such libel; and also to 
make such order or decree concerning the care and custody of the minor 
children of the parties ."30 The McGlinn rule fails as a solution to the enclave 
civil law problem, however, because it forces plaintiffs to unearth statutory 
fossils before they can attain recourse, and, as one commentator has noted, 
"[t]he cost of [this] legal research would make most suits impractical, leaving 
small or even fairly sizable claims unenforceable due to financial necessity."31 
Such problems are compounded by the fact that most federal enclaves consist 
of tracts of land absorbed by the federal government at different times; the sub­
stantive law governing a single transaction involving several enclave tracts-for 
example, a suit for breach of contract where the cause of action has no tract-
24. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885) (state liability la� applies 
to railroad for incident occurring on military enclave). For a modem-day application of the McGl1nn Rule, 
see City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1449-50 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
25. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963) (federal policy precludes state milk pricing scheme 
from operating on California bases). 
26. Howard v. Commissioners of The Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 62� (1953) 
(Louisville's annexation of adjoining naval plant under exclusive legislative jurisdiction did not mterfere 
in material way with enclave). 
27. McGlinn, 114 U.S. at 546. t 28. See Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929) (private proprietor of hotel located in �o 
Springs National Park held liable under common law for damages done to belongings of guest resul�mg 
from fire, despite state law passed nine years after cession releasing innkeepers from common law abso ute 
liability); see also James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940). A 29. This was considered a legal separation, terminable at the will of the parties. J. SCHOOLER, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 222, at 343 (5th ed. 1895). 
codified 30. Army Brief, supra note 3, at 8 (quoting 1820 MASS. ACTS, ch. 56, § I; current statute 
at MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 18 (West 1986)). 
31. Note, supra note 14, at 758. 
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specific situs-might vary from tract to tract, all within the same federal 
enclave.32 
The Paul rule, the second of the three doctrinal approaches to enclave litiga­
tion, moves only slightly beyond the McGlinn rule by adding that a subsequent 
state regulatory scheme consistent with the "basic state law" in existence at the 
time of the transfer is also applicable within the enclave.33 In sum, under the 
McGlinn rule, state laws can only be applied within enclaves if they were in 
effect when cession took place, while under the Paul rule, state laws generated 
subsequent to cession can be applied, provided they reflect the same basic 
scheme of domestic relations in effect when cession took place. For example, 
in Cobb v. Cobb,34 Massachusetts' current abuse prevention statute35 could 
have been applied on the grounds that it provides relief of a nature similar to 
that provided by the 1820 statute.36 The Paul rule does little to lessen the 
discretion of courts and the research burden placed on plaintiffs who are victims 
of domestic violence and in need of immediate recourse, however. 
The third doctrinal approach, the most recent and presently the most ap­
plied,37 rejects the traditional enclave jurisprudence discussed above. As articu­
lated in Howard v. Commissioners of Louisvi/le38 and reiterated in Evans v. 
Cornman,39 the rule of noninterference dictates that all state laws are valid 
within federal enclaves unless they interfere with the jurisdiction asserted by 
the federal government. Issues involving federal-state relations are resolved 
through the premise that enclaves remain part of the surrounding state: "The 
fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state from 
exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long as there 
is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government."40 
The practical result of the Howard rule in a domestic violence case with a 
32. Altieri, supra note 11, at 88. 
33. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963). 
34. 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (1989). 
35. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 18 (West 1986): 
The probate court in which the action for divorce is pending may, upon petition of the wife, 
prohibit the husband, or upon petition of the husband, prohibit the wife from imposing any 
restraint upon her or his personal liberty during the pendency of the action for divorce. Upon the 
petition of the husband or wife or of the guardian of either, the court may make such further order 
as it deems necessary to protect either party or their children, to preserve the peace or to carry 
out the purposes of this section re lative to restraint on personal liberty. 
See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 19 (West 1986) (providing for temporary custody of minor 
children dur ing pendency of divorce proceedings). 
36. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
37. Altieri, supra note 11, at 90. This trend towards applying the noninterference doctrine was 
recognized by the Cobb court. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
38. 344 U.S. 624 (1953). 
39. 398 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1970) (in light of fact that enclave residents are subjected to state criminal 
law, state taxes, state unemployment and workmen's compensation laws, vehicle registration and licensing 
laws, process and jurisdiction of state courts, and can use state courts and state public schools, enclave 
residents are "treated by the State of Maryland as state residents to such an extent that it is a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment for the State to deny them the right to vote"). 
40. Howard, 344 U.S. at 627. 
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civilian-abuser is that, where a state court feels jurisdictionally certain enough 
to issue a temporary restraining order,41 the abuser will likely be ordered off 
base. However, in the case of a soldier-abuser,42 it is possible that the nonin­
terference rule will protect the abuser from such an order on the grounds that 
it is in the federal interest that the soldier live on base-to be on call and 
immediately available to serve his commander. Without the commander's 
support, a state court order has no force.43 
Predictability is lacking from all three traditional enclave doctrines: the 
McGlinn rule leaves legal research obstacles to be tripped upon by the unwary 
enclave resident who leaves the military installation in search of recourse; the 
Paul rule offers modern-day recourse only if it can be traced to the scheme of 
governing in effect during what may be the previous century; and the Howard 
rule offers state courts only tentative grounds for asserting jurisdiction, resulting 
in recourse for domestic violence victims that can be snatched away if a 
military commander chooses to call "interference.'' In light of the fact that all 
of these doctrines are in essence "good law," outcomes in enclave domestic 
violence litigation are covered with scales of unpredictability. 
C. Court Access for Enclave-Connected Civil Cases 
The doors of federal courts are closed to victims of domestic violence.44 
The remaining options for obtaining recourse through the doctrines discussed 
41. Because the abuser in this scenario is a civilian over whom, relative to military personnel, the 
military has little authority, military authorities are likely to seek a state court order before forcing the 
civilian-abuser out of his home and off base. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
42. In this scenario, the abuser is a soldier in whom the military has an interest and may therefore 
protect from state authorities. 
43. Brief of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services and the Attorney General as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at 29, Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E. 2d 1161 (1989) (No. 
SJC-5039) [hereinafter Social Services Brief]. It should be noted that Army regulations arising out of the 
Secretary of the Army's general rulemaking authority may preempt state law even without express 
Congressional authorization to displace state law. See generally Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) 
(Treasury regulation trumps state law). When preempting state law, military authorities do not have to 
overcome any presumption against federal administrative preemption of state Jaw, nor do they have to sustain 
any strict scrutiny standard of review. See generally Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dela Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982) (no express congressional authorization needed to displace state Jaw). See also 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 484 (1942) (holding that departmental regulations have 
force of law). . 
44. This forum is eliminated by the fact that federal courts deny jurisdiction in a variety of domesttc 
relations matters even when diversity and amount in controversy are established. The rationale for federal 
court refusal to assert jurisdiction, discussed supra note 4, includes recognition of: (i) a strong stat: ��res; 
in domestic relations; (ii) the competence of state courts in settling family disputes; (iii) the pos�t�ih.
ty od 
incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases where there is ccntinuing state court supervision. an 
(iv) congested federal dockets. Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally �hilli�s, 
Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that federal �versiz 
jurisdiction does not extend to matrimonial actions); Ostrom v. Ostrom, 231 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 195 & 
(holding that federal district court has no power in divorce suits); P. BATOR, P. MISHKlN, D. SHAPIR�Zd 
H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1189-1192 
ed. 1973). 
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above are therefore the court within the state where the enclave sits and the 
court of some other state. Victims of domestic violence often face immediate 
danger, and therefore should be able to obtain recourse at the nearest court. 
Most state law categorizes claims as e ither local or transitory,45 the latter 
capable of being brought anywhere personal jurisdiction over the parties can 
be obtained.46 In light of the fact that state courts are most familiar with 
adjudicating family law cases and federal courts refuse to adjudicate them,47 
a victim of enclave domestic violence might find recourse in the local state 
court, or court of another state willing to embrace the claim as transitory, so 
long as service of the opposing party can be completed.48 
Establishing a local claim often means meeting domiciliary requirements. 
Enclave residents capable of meeting residency requirements for the state in 
which the enclave is situated may claim the surrounding state as domicile and 
bring local actions. Nevertheless, many enclave residents will fail to meet 
jurisdictional requirements predicated on domicile: most are temporary residents 
on federal pro perty and ma intain permanent residency elsewhere . 49 It should 
be noted, however, that there are some cases holding that enclave residency 
satisfies state jurisdiction requirements,50 and , for actions involving divorce, 
a number of states have enacted statutes providing that residency on military 
installations creates a presumption of state residency. 51 
45. Transitory claims typically are of either a tort or contract nature. 
46. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 355 (1914) ("A State cannot create 
a transitory cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue [on that transitory cause of action) 
in any court having jurisdiction . ... "). 
47. See supra note 44. 
48. As established throughout this Note, when state courts arm enclave residents with protection from 
domestic violence, federal officials can take away that protection by claiming it interferes with the federal 
interest in establishing the enclave. The solution proposed in this Note, infra text accompanying notes 73-
105, would change the preceding scenario so that, rather than taking away protection given by state courts 
through the doctrine of noninterference, federal officials would have to enter the appellate process to 
challenge state court decisions. The proposal also eliminates the hesitation of state courts to get involved 
by granting them jurisdictional certainty. Thus, at the very least, the proposed solution would offer the 
victims of domestic violence immediate recourse and time to contact family and friends, find alternative 
living arrangements, and file for divorce (thereby severing joint tenancies) before that recourse is taken 
away. 
49. See, e.g., Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729 (1926) (holding residents of exclusive 
jurisdiction area, otherwise fulfilling state residency requirements, cannot file for divorce because not 
residents of state); see also Chaney v. Chaney, 53 N.M. 66, 201 P.2d 782 (1949) (holding residency in 
condemned area of Los Alamos Project does not satisfy residency requirements of divorce statute). 
50. See, e.g., Shea v. Gehan, 70 Ga. App. 229, 28 S.E.2d 181 (1943) (in petition brought to have 
Veterans' Hospital patient adjudged insane, state courts have jurisdiction over any insane person found 
within their limits); In re Kernan, 247 A.D. 664, 288 N.Y.S. 329, aff' d, Ex parte Kernan, 272 N.Y. 560, 
4 N.E.2d 737 (1936) (state court found to have jurisdiction to entertain divorced mother's habeas corpus 
proceeding to inquire into custody of child living at barracks with army officer father). 
51. E.g., VA. CODE§ 20-97 (1990 Ann.) (presumption of state residency for purposes of divorce actions 
for service members and their spouses living together for at least six months); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 36-4-
104(b) ( 1984 rep!. vol.) (presumption of state residency for purposes of divorce actions for service members or their spouses when residents for at least one year). 
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Once a forum is chosen, that forum faces the problem of how to determine 
the applicable substantive law. With enclave-based domestic violence-such 
as in the case of Cobb v. Cobl>-conflicts of law rules are likely to result in 
application of"enclave law," leaving courts to choose among the three doctrinal 
approaches discussed above.52 
D. Explaining the Lack of Litigation Over Enclave Domestic Violence 
According to military statistics, "[t]here were 11,931 substantiated reports 
of spouse abuse and 5,488 substantiated reports of child abuse (of both a sexual 
and nonsexual nature) involving both male and female soldier-perpetrators 
during the [two-year] period July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1987."53 Beyond 
the fact that these figures do not account for soldier-victims such as Diane 
Cobb, they are conservative,54 if not misleading.55 
52. One problem not fully addressed by the proposed solution, and beyond the scope of this Note, is 
service of process. Although during this century many states have reserved authority to serve judicial process 
as a condition of cession, in the case of older enclaves, the ability of states to serve process upon residents 
of federal enclaves is a pressing procedural issue. See Altieri, supra note ll ,  at 71. Under the present 
enclave doctrine, service can be disallowed where the process relates to an incident occurring within the 
installation, even if there has been a reservation of rights to serve process, on the grounds that such a 
reservation would enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of the state to apply its substantive law, and, in 
doing so, would enable the state to interfere with the federal interest in establishing the enclave. See 
Weintraub, City of Philadelphia v. John E. Bullion-The Federal Enclave is Not a Sanctuary, ARMY LAW., 
Jan. 1980, at 16 n.4 (commander requiring legal office to review documents prior to service). 
53. Arquilla, Crime in the Home, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1988, at 6 n.30. 
54. As a point of comparison to the reported incidence rate of 17,419 over a two-year period for the 
3,393,882 military personnel, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LIST OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, AUll!ORIZED 
FULL-TIME ASSIGNED PERSONNEL (INCLUDING FY 1987), and their families (this figure is unavailable), 
consider the recorded incidents of domestic violence in Massachusetts-a state with a population of 
approximately 5,871,000. U.S. DEPAR1MENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES XV ( 109th ed. 1989). The number of petitions filed for protection from abuse just by Massach�tts 
residents in Massachusetts, in 1988 alone, was 30,285. Social Services Brief, supra note 43, at6 n.1 (ciung 
Statistical Report of the Massachusetts Trial Court, 1985 and 1988). 
Also, for a discussion of the pressures on the residents of military installations who are victims of 
domestic violence not to report their attackers, see Nichols, The Military Installation: How the Company 
Town Deals with Rape, Spouse Abuse and Child Abuse, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 242, 250 (1982) ("Even if the care 
is sensitive [which, Nichols argues, it usually is not], a victim may choose not to report the attack because 
of the 'company town' mentality which conditions her not to make waves."). 
. d 55. During the period October l, 1986 through September 30, 1987, the Army reported a rate of chil 
abuse roughly one-third that of the national rate (the rate of child abuse in the Army during this period was 
reported as 10.2 children per 1,000, while the national rate for 1985 was reported as 30.6 children per 
1,000), Arquilla, supra note 53, at 4 n.8, in spite of the fact that 73% of Army soldiers are under thirty-?� 
years of age, many married with children, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE 
ALMANAC 30, 33 (Sept-Oct. 1987), and that within the general population the rate of spouse and child a�use 
for husbands and wives under thirty-one years of age is more than twice that for husbands and WJV� 
between the ages of thirty-one and fifty, M. STRAUS , R. GELLES, & S. STEINMETZ. BEHIND CLOSE 
DOORS-VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 129' 140-44, and 181-90 ( 1981 ). In fact, "Family 
Advoc:z 
staff generally classify young families to be a 'high risk' population insofar as the likelihood of spo�se te 
child abuse is concerned," Arquilla, supra note 53, at 4 n.8, which suggests that the Army's reporting 7 d 
for its young population should be at least as high as that of the general population. It has also �n asserh�r 
that "[a] woman who admits to the [military] hospital that her injuries are a result of a beating fr�":_�ls 
· "N1c11v • 
husband may find that the entry in her medical records indicates that she fell down the stairs. 
supra note 54, at 244. 
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Though domestic violence on federal enclaves is substantial, there may be 
no recourse for its victims, since "those state civil laws requiring enforcement 
by state officials (e.g., child protection laws) only apply to the extent that 
federal laws and military regulations do not conflict with state law . . . and the 
installation commander invites the state authorities, by agreement or otherwise, 
to exercise their authority on the installation."S6 Agreements signed by installa­
tion commanders that immediately deliver domestic relations disputes into the 
hands of state courts and authorities are far from being the norm, since the 
military generally likes to take care of enclave-based domestic violence itself. 
Military procedure dictates that "the commander of the accused sol­
dier . . .  decid[ es] on whether a particular report of an abuse-related crime is 
supported by the available evidence, and, if so, whether the offense warrants 
prosecution or another disposition."57 It follows that "[t]he total number of 
abuse-related crimes being tried by court-martial is very small in relation to the 
total number of all substantiated reports of spouse and child abuse in the Army 
each year. "s8 Moreover, even if a state district court is not precluded from 
issuing restraining orders, and, once issued, such orders are legally effective 
within the confines of a federal enclave, state court orders do not necessarily 
pack an on-enclave impact: the power to carry out such orders on federal 
enclaves rests with military authorities.s9 
When domestic violence is caused by a soldier-abuser,60 the abuser is ulti­
mately subject only to his commander 's authority, which may mean protection 
from his victim's legal recourse.61 When a soldier, such as Diane Cobb, is the 
56. Social Services Brief, supra note 43 app. C (Army Regulation 608-18). This is true to a lesser 
extent where, rather than the exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction common to most installations in the 
United States, there is concurrent legislative jurisdiction established through a state's reservation of rights. 
In the event of concurrent legislative jurisdiction, state civil and criminal laws apply and may be enforced 
by state officials in state courts, but, again, only to the extent that there is no interference with the federal 
function or military mission of the enclave. 
57. Arquilla, supra note 53, at 4 (citing Army Regulation 608-18). 
58. Id. at 12. ("[S]oldiers generally are not being tried by court-martial for abuse-related crimes, except 
in cases where they have killed their wives or children, or have raped or otherwise indecently assaulted their 
children."). 
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. It also should be noted that, under the traditional view 
of exclusive legislative jurisdiction, local officials-such as local police officers-acting on enclaves under 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction lack authority and, consequently, may find that they are not entitled to 
immunity when sued. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) ("The fact that the action here taken 
was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's [a government agency director's] line of duty is enough to 
render the privilege applicable . . . .  ") (emphasis added). 
60. Situations may also arise in which both the abuser and victim of abuse are soldiers: 
One military wife told me that after she complained to her husband's commander about his 
beating her, the commander lectured his troops on the importance of not letting stress affect their 
job performance. He suggested that one way to let off steam was to 'beat your old lady. ' The 
reason this military wife knew of the lecture is that she herself was on active duty at the time 
and was one of the troops lectured. 
Nichols, supra note 54, at 244. 
61. "The military community . . .  has a highly structured pecking order and it's likely that a person 
of high status would be more protected than he would in the civilian world." Id. at 245. It should also be 
noted that, "[i]n a series of decisions beginning with United States v. Weeks, 20 M.J. 22 (C.M.A. 1985), 
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victim of a civilian-abuser, the commander does not possess the same power 
to require the abuser to vacate the installation and may need the leverage of 
a court order to exercise authority. 62 When the victim is a child and removal 
from her parents is necessary, army authorities are powerless without state law: 
there is absolutely no provision in military or federal law for the authorization 
of such removal.63 
In sum, without guaranteed access to state law, there is no reliable protec­
tion for the victims of domestic violence who reside on federal en­
claves-whether the victim is a soldier or civilian, adult or child.64 The case 
of Cobb v. Cobb, a recent illustration of this problem, provides a point of 
departure for the reexamination and reform of enclave doctrine. 
III. COBB V. COBB 
A. The Factual Background65 
Diane Cobb, a service member in the United States Army, resides in Fort 
Devens, Massachusetts-a federal enclave. She has been married to James 
Cobb, a civilian, for three years, and they have a two-year-old son. On Decem­
ber 2, 1988, Diane filed a complaint in a Massachusetts state court seeking an 
order to restrain her husband from approaching, contacting or abusing her. 
According to two affidavits filed in the lower court and Diane's testimony, 
James Cobb is an alcoholic and a drug abuser. In July 1988, James attacked 
Diane and threatened her with a knife; she subsequently fled to a women's 
shelter. Dia�e obtained an order from a Massachusetts state district court 
restraining her husband from abusing her and ordering him out of their home. 
the Court of Military Appeals held that evidence of good military character is admissible as substantive 
evidence to prove that an accused did not commit the charged acts . . . .  An outstanding combat record has 
traditionally been a mitigating factor in adjudging a sentence and in reviewing its appropriateness." United 
States v. Benedict, 20 M.J. 939, 944 (1985) (citations omitted) (in case of general court-martial conviction 
for indecent acts with ten-year-old girl, court considered accused's superior record for service and determined 
appropriate only so much of sentence as provided for dismissal, confinement at hard labor for eighteen 
months, and forfeiture of pay and allowances). 
62. "The jurisdiction of military tribunals does not extend to persons, including military dependents 
who reside on federal enclaves, who are not members of the armed forces . . . . " In re Terry Y., 101 Cal. 
App. 3d 178, 182, 161 Cal. Rptr. 452, 454 (1980) (citation omitted); see also supra note 13. 
63. Social Services Brief, supra note 43, at 23-24. 
64. The current lack or-adequate protection for child victims of military abusers on federal enclaves 
was recognimcl in the child abuse/custody case of Terry Y.: "Unless Monterey County acts to protect the 
children at Fort Ord, these children may be left without governmental protection." Terry Y., 101 Cal. App. 
3d at 182, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 454. And, as one military scholar has noted, "(m]eeting the needs of these 
children requires not only an Army family action plan, but action by society as well." Arquilla, supra note 
53, at 13 (footnote omitted). Although it has been held that state laws regarding both mental commitment 
and the guardianship of neglected children apply to persons living on military bases, Board of Chosen 
Freeholders v. Mccorkle, 98 N.J. Super 451, 237 A.2d 640 (1968), the application of these laws is 
conditioned upon there being no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the federal government. 
65. See Plaintiff Brief, supra note 2, at 4-7 (factual situation as it existed when the case was heard by 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on September 5, 1989). 
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James then began attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and sought 
help from a psychiatrist, and the couple began to see a marriage counselor. In 
August 1988, Diane permitted her husband to move back home, and in October 
she requested that the restraining order be lifted. 
But soon the alcohol abuse resumed, and so did the violence and physical 
abuse. Diane asked for a divorce. James initially agreed to leave their house. 
However, upon returning home from work on several occasions, Diane discov­
ered him hiding in closets. On one occasion, Diane discovered him hiding in 
the attic; at that time James told Diane that he planned to kill her. 
Ultimately, James Cobb was charged with armed assault and assault with 
intent to kill. Knowing that Diane was to return from a Thanksgiving holiday, 
James armed himself with a knife, waited at the airport, and, when he saw 
soldier Eric Jackson who was there to pick Diane up, he stabbed Jackson with 
a knife. 
Diane, fearful for her life and the life of her two-year-old child in the event 
of her husband 's release from jail, sought protection from a Massachusetts state 
court. This plea for protection raised the question of whether a state court is 
deprived of jurisdiction to restrain potential acts of domestic violence because 
the victim of abuse is a member of the United States Armed Forces and resides 
on a federal enclave. 66 
B. Rethinking the Doctrine in Light of Cobb v. Cobb 
Cobb v. Cobb put the Department of the Army in the awkward position of 
arguing in favor of using a state court to protect one of its own, while attempt­
ing to shield the doctrine of exclusive legislative jurisdiction for federal en­
claves from the noninterference approach.67 This is an interesting twist on 
cases in which federal supremacy insulates military personnel and employees 
from state remedies that would, allegedly, interfere with the performance of 
assigned duties-a TRO to keep an abusive soldier away from his wife who 
is residing on a military base, for example. Hence, Cobb v. Cobb illustrates 
that, in domestic violence cases, the application of state law on federal enclaves 
is necessary to protect soldiers as well as civilians.68 
According to the Department of the Army, even the doctrine of noninterfer­
ence (a presumption in favor of applying state law in federal enclaves) is unac-
66. See supra note 12. 
67. See Army Brief, supra note 3. As mentioned previously, the Army argued in favor of applying 
the McG/inn rule and granting recourse under an 1820 Massachusetts statute. See supra notes 29-32 and 
accompanying text. 
68. Permitting enclave domestic violence to be treated by state courts applying state law is also in the 
general public's interest: "The military community is not a separate, isolated nation. Its residents are merely 
h���n beings who follow a certain life style for a number of years. They interact with members of the 
civilian community, for better or worse, and eventually become civilians themselves." Nichols, supra note 
54, at 25 l. 
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ceptable since it "would destroy all significance to federal enclaves because 
even on non-federal enclaves, federal law supersedes any interfering state law 
by virtue of the supremacy clause. "69 In light of such military resistance to 
anything less than pure veto power over the application of state law, unless 
domestic violence is held above government claims of interference, the suprem­
acy clause,70 exclusive legislation clause,71 and property clause72 ensure that 
the federal government always will be able to challenge the application of state 
law within federal enclaves on the grounds that it interferes with federal 
interests. In the absence of a domestic violence exception to the noninterference 
doctrine, relief for soldier-victims may be delayed due to the jurisdictional 
uncertainty of state courts; and when the Diane Cobbs are not soldiers but are 
married or born to them, they may find no redress for their suffering. 
N. TERRY Y.: THE BEGINNINGS OF A SOLUTION 
Congress has responded to the enclave jurisdiction problem in the area of 
criminal law through the Assimilative Crimes Act.73 But, in the area of civil 
law, Congress' response has been more piecemeal: state unemployment laws, 74 
workmen's compensation laws,75 state laws governing actions for personal 
injury and wrongful death,76 and state taxing laws under the Buck Act77 are 
the pieces of civil law that have been assimilated into federal enclave law. 
Congress has not yet responded to the problem of domestic violence on federal 
enclaves. 
A domestic violence exception must be carved out of the exclusive legisla­
tive jurisdiction of federal enclaves. Congress should either enact legislation 
or expand the Assimilative Crimes Act to include federal recognition of tempo­
rary restraining orders issued by state courts78 in cases of enclave domestic 
69. Army Brief, supra note 3, at 13. 
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For text of clause, see supra note 7. 
7 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. For text of clause, see supra note 6. 
72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For text of clause, see supra note 8. 
73. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1987) (incorporates certain state criminal laws into federallaw applicable on federal 
enclaves, essentially making state criminal law federal law). The Assimilative Crimes Act was intended to 
patch over holes in the criminal law applicable to federal enclaves by incorporating state law. Therefore, 
state criminal statutes are not assimilated when there is applicable federal law (no hole to patch over). Ste 
United States v. Kaufman, 862 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1988). 
74. 26 u.s.c. § 3305(d) (1988). 
75. 40 u.s.c. § 290 (1982). 
76. 16 u.s.c. § 457 (1988). 
77. 4 U.S.C. § 104-10, as discussed in Weintraub, supra note 52, at 15. 
78. The Assimilative Crimes Act turns state criminal law into federal law to be applied by federal 
courts. As established above, supra note 44 and accompanying text, federal courts are not family courts, 
nor are they likely to have any interest in acting as family court surrogates. Moreover, civilian victims 
should not be limited to seeking recourse from courts within the military community-a community that 
relies on its service members to carry out the military mission that is its sole purpose for existence, and 
whose legal system applies justice with an eye on one's service record. See supra note 61. 
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violence.19 A state court and state-law-specific provision is essential, for, 
without such a provision, the restraining order recourse provided by an expand­
ed Assimilative Crimes Act might melt in the hands of military discretion: 
"State laws are not applied to federal enclaves through the Assimilative Crimes 
Act if the state law provision would conflict with existent federal law or 
policy."so To keep their problems at home, military courts could, in the name 
of military and thus federal interest, shield the assimilation of such state law 
remedies by holding up inadequate enclave-generated remedies. 81 
Federal policy preemption82 must be avoided for cases of domestic vio­
lence. Thus, to the Assimilative Crimes Act must be fused recognition that there 
is a federal interest in providing the victims of domestic violence with the 
highest .possible level of recourse. Courts have begun to nudge the law in this 
direction by adopting the doctrine of noninterference's presumption in favor 
of applying state law: all state laws are valid within federal enclaves unless they 
interfere with the jurisdiction asserted by the federal government. 83 However, 
while the victims of enclave domestic violence are awaiting a response from 
Congress, courts should go further and limit the circumstances in which the 
federal government may yell "interference" by explicitly recognizing that the 
protection of victims of domestic violence is itself a federal interest with which 
other government interests should not interfere. Precedent for this, to some 
extent, has been set at the state level in the case of In re Terry Y.84 
79. A similar provision was added to the Assimilative Crimes Act for driving under the influence of 
�gs o� alcohol, and ther� have been a number of criminal prosecutions of soldiers for drunk dri
ving. See, 
·� .. Umted St:ites v. Hamilton, 838 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Mariea, 795 F.2d 1094 (1st 
�If. 1986). In hght of these successful drunk-driving convictions, it should be noted that crimes of domestic 
violence although categ 'zed " · 'l" · · · • on as c1v1 m nature, are v10lent cnmes and therefore deserve the same 
response Congress has extended to criminal actions. 
c· 81
°
9
· King v. Ge�ini Food Serv., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 964, 966 (E.D. Va 1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 297 (4th 
u. 77), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 ( 1978). 
81. See United States v F lk 631 F s 
enacted 
· u erson, · upp. 319 (D. Haw. 1 986) (federal agency regulations 
throu h �:
r�ua.nt �o con�ressional authority have force of law and may preempt assimilation of state law 
P
-.. g similative Cnmes Act); see also United States v. Eades, 615 F 2d 617 (4th Cir 1980) (Congress 
...... mpted Maryland crim f th' d d · . · 
· 
of assa It fed 
e o rr - egree sexual offense by making simple assault and aggravated forms 
is narr
� 
.era! offenses); United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976) (fact that federal statute 
governm
:
e
: 
� scope than that offered by state law prohibiting similar conduct does not allow federal 
82 
n ° use state law to broaden definition of federal crime). 
As es�b
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�
p
:
;:
p
��
n co�ld take a number of forms (e.g., reference to Military Family Action Plans). 
believe that 
g ut this Note-see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text-there is reason to 
recourse from with' th ir · · 
accompanying text Th . 
m e m •tary community is not enough. See also infra note 96 and 
Providing too h
. e senousness of the problem suggests that error should be made on the side of 
should be the
:S
�
c recourse. Victims should have access to both on-base and off-base recourse; the choice 
83. See infra note 105 d . 
84. 101 C 1 A 
an accompanying text regarding enforcement of state court orders. 
a · pp. 3d 178, 161 Cal. Rptr. 452 ( 1980). 
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A. The Significance of In re Terry Y. 
Terry Y. involved the removal of an abused child-after he suffered four 
fractures over a two-year period-from his parents who lived on a military 
base.85 Noting that, "in the area of the rights of federal enclave residents to 
state benefits, there has been a trend in state courts to hold that the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Congress does not deprive enclave residents of benefits which 
would otherwise be theirs," the court exercised the noninterference presumption 
in favor of applying state law.86 Moreover, it sustained that presumption 
against protests that the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction conflicted with 
federal sovereignty by recognizing that "[t]he Monterey County Juvenile 
Court's exercise of its statutory jurisdiction to protect Terry promoted the 
federal policy toward abused children as reflected in the applicable Army 
Regulations and the Social Se curity Act."87 
The Terry Y. decision is significant because a congressional policy, articu­
lated in a federal statute, was used to shield the domestic relations remedy 
granted by a local court from claims of federal jurisdiction.88 Nevertheless, 
Terry Y. by itself is not enough to carry the doctrine of noninterference beyond 
helping soldier-victims. In Terry Y., as in Cobb v. Cobb, military personnel not 
only declined to oppose the jurisdiction of the state courts, they actively sought 
it.89 Moreover, the Terry Y. decision relied on congressional legislation to 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 453, citing Note, Rights of Federal Enc/aye Residents to State Residency Benefits, 49 CALIF. 
L.  REV. 550 (1961). 
87. 161 Cal. Rptr. at 455. The court relied upon Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Mccorkle, 98 N.J. 
Super. 45 1, 237 A.2d 640 (1968), from which it quoted: "The conferring of a benefit required by federal 
Jaw cannot be construed as an act which undermines the federal sovereignty." 161 Cal. Rptr. at 454. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado applied this same reasoning earlier in County Commissioners of 
Arapahoe v. Donoho: 
The conferring of a benefit required by federal law cannot be construed as an act which under­
mines the federal sovereignty. Indeed by paying relief in these circumstances the federal policy 
to recognize citizens of the United States is fostered and promoted . . . .  It is illogical to suppose 
that the federal government would interfere with the county carrying out a program contemplated 
by federal statute. 
144 Colo. 321, 332-33, 356 P.2d 267, 273-74 (1960) (case in which county welfare board denied claim of 
resident of military installation under exclusive legislative jurisdiction). 
88. Specifically, the Terry Y. court relied upon Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
620-26, which authorizes grants to the states for establishing, extending and strengthening child welfare 
services. 101  Cal. App. 3d 181,  183, 161 Cal. Rptr. 452, 454. The court's rationale was that: 
In order to qualify for funds allotted under Title IV-B, a state must make a satisfactory showing 
that it is making available its child welfare services 'in all political subdivisions of the State, for 
all children in need thereof'(42 U.S.C. § 622(a)(2)). As federal enclaves such as Fort Ord remain 
geographically and legally a part of the state in which they are located, it follows that Congress 
contemplated that the state would make its services available to the children on federal enclaves. 
101 Cal. App. 3d 1 8 1 ,  183, 161 Cal. Rptr. 452, at 455 (1980) (citation omitted). 
89. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 182, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 454; see also Army Brief, infra note 95. 
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shore up its "federal policy" argument. 90 Thus, the federal interest in protect­
ing Terry Y. was insulated from exclusive legislation clause91 challenges. 
Federal policy arguments are more difficult to come by in the area of 
spouse abuse. However, although explicit congressional legislation is lacking,92 
federal interest in providing recourse has been codified to a limited degree in 
the Victims of Crime Act of 1 984.93 In fact, state programs that do not extend 
onto federal enclaves may be denied federal funding: The eligibility require­
ments for state victim compensation programs seeking the federal funds estab­
lished by this Act explicitly state that such programs must provide "compensa­
tion to victims of crimes occurring within such State that would be compensa­
ble crimes, but for the fact that such crimes are subject to federal jurisdiction, 
on the same basis that such program provides compensation to victims of 
compensable crimes. "94 
There are also Army regulations and procedures which might be cited as 
recognition of a federal policy to prevent and provide recourse for domestic 
violence.95 For example, Army Family Action Plans are generated annually 
through conferences, attended by representatives from all major Army com­
mands, in which "those who seek to advance the interests of Army families in 
spouse and child abuse cases, as well as in all other areas of military life, have 
90. The federal interest in preventing child abuse has been shored up even further by the Children's 
Justice and Assistance Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3, 290ee-3, 5101,  5103 ,  5 1 05, 5 1 17 et. seq., 1060 1, 
10603, 10603a ( 1982). The objectives of this Act include: (i) encouraging states to enact child protection 
reforms; (ii) protecting child victims from further abuse during proceedings and increasing the chances of 
successful legal action against abusers; (iii) requiring participating states to adopt recommendations of multi­
disciplinary task forces on child abuse; (iv) amending the Victim of Crime Act of 1984 to authorize child 
abuse prevention and treatment grants; (v) directing the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect to 
disseminate information to states and local officials; and (vi) authorizing disclosure of alcohol and drug 
abuse patient treatment records to facilitate reporting of child abuse and neglect. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103 
(1982). 
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. For text of clause, see supra note 6. 
92. This may soon change, for United States Senator Dan Coats recently articulated his intention to 
introduce legislation to increase awareness about and prevent domestic violence, and Senator Joseph Biden 
has already introduced the Violence Against Women Act of 1990, which attempts to make both the streets 
and homes safer for women and extends civil rights protection to victims of sex crimes. See Coats Looks 
at Family Abuse Laws, United Press International, August 29, 1990, Wednesday (BC cycle); Lopez, supra 
note 92. Biden's bill provides $25 million to establish special spouse-abuse prosecuting units and doubles 
funding for battered spouse shelters. See Phillips, Legislation Planned to Combat Violence Against Women, 
Gannett News Service, June 19, 1990, Tuesday. 
93. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. XIV, § 1404, 98 Stat. 2 1 72 (1 984), current version at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 10603 (West Supp. 1990) (stating that, as to federal grants for state crime victim assistance programs, 
"priority shall be given to eligible crime victim assistance programs providing assistance to victims of sexual 
assault, spousal abuse, or child abuse"). 
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10602 (West Supp. 1990). The eligibility standards also stipulate that such programs 
must make "compensation awards to victims who are nonresidents of the State on the basis of the same 
criteria used to make awards to victims who are residents of such State." Id. 
95. The Department of the Army has itself articulated this federal policy in its Cobb v. Cobb brief: 
"The availability of such relief to service members residing on a federal enclave is also a question of great 
concern to the Department of the Army because of its vital interest in protecting soldiers and their family 
members from domestic violence." Army Brief, supra note 3, at 1 .  
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a forum."96 It is difficult to argue credibly. that a military claim of interference 
with a military mission is mooted by a federal policy simply because this policy 
is articulated in military regulations. It might be credibly argued, however, that 
a given military commander's discretionary claim of interference is mooted by 
an overarching federal policy of protecting the victims of domestic violence, 
as articulated in the military institution's regulations. Whether this would 
encourage the military to abandon such regulations, however, is a question that 
cannot be ignored. 
B. The Federal Interest in Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence 
To protect the victims of abuse from soldier-abusers with or without the 
support of military authority and ensure state court jurisdiction and recourse 
for soldier-victims, the Terry Y. holding must be expanded. The federal interest 
in protecting victims of domestic violence who live on federal enclaves should 
be recognized as a federal interest-a protected interest capable of enduring 
most military claims of interference.97 
Since a woman is beaten about every eighteen seconds,98 one out of every 
thirteen murders in the United States involves the killing of a spouse, and in 
one out of every five murders the victim is a family member of, or involved 
romantically with, his or her killer,99 it is difficult to imagine how a restrain­
ing order on a soldier-abuser could interfere with, or be contrary to, the overall 
96. Arquilla, supra note 53, at 4; see, e.g., Department of Army, Pamphlet No. 608-41, Personal Af­
fairs-The Army Family Action Plan IV (June 19, 1987) (updated versions of pamphlet have been generated 
for 1988 to present); see also Army Regulation 608- 18, Chapter 7, issued by order of the Secretary of the 
Army on September 18, 1987 (describing the Anny Child Advocacy Program, ACAP). 
As established previously, however, in light of (i) the discretionary power granted to enclave command­
ers, (ii) the fact that the military has a vested interest in its soldiers, and (iii) the "company town" pressure 
not to report such crimes articulated in Nichols, supra note 54, off-enclave state recourse must be available 
for the victims of enclave-based domestic violence. 
97. This principle of filling in the enclave civil law gap to offer on-enclave protection equal to that 
available around enclaves was realized over a half a century ago in the area of workmen's co.mpensation: 
"The purpose of the amended bill is to fill a conspicuous gap in the workmen's compensation field by 
furnishing protection against death or disability to laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or other 
persons on Federal property." S. REP. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 ( 1936); "The bill is absolutely 
necessary so that protection can be given to men employed on projects as set out in the foregoing para­
graph." H.R. REP. No. 2656, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936). 
98. Phillips, Legislation Planned to Combat Violence Against Women, Gannett News Service, June 
19, 1990. 
99. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
at 12 (1988) (calculated by compiling statistics that (i) wives are victims of 5.2 percent and (ii) husbands 
are victims of 2.3 percent of all murders). In light of the preceding, consider that, according to the United 
States Department of Justice's national statistics for 1988, "[a]mong all female murder victims in 1988, 
[thirty-one] percent were slain by husbands or boyfriends," and "five percent of the male victims were killed 
by wives or girlfriends." Id.; see also Lopez, Landmark Bill Would Attack Escalating Violent Crime, Chicago 
Tribune, July l, 1990, Sunday (final ed.) ("The crime rate against women in the United States is significantly 
higher than in other countries, with three out of four likely to be victims of at least one violent crime during 
their lifetimes . . . . "). 
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federal interest.100 The military is not without capacity to work around such 
orders so as to continue carrying out the federal functions of its enclaves. 101 
Even if, in the extreme example, it is absolutely necessary for a soldier-abuser 
to reside on base, the military could accommodate the federal interest of 
preventing domestic violence by supplying alternative enclave housing for the 
abuser. The victims of domestic violence should not be pushed outside their 
homes. 
Another, perhaps preferable, alternative would be for the military, with the 
victim's consent, to finance comparable off-enclave housing for the victim of 
abuse until the restraining order protecting her is removed or until the victim 
is able to finalize a divorce.102 This would not only separate the victim from 
her soldier-abuser, but would also enable her to separate herself from the close­
knit military community. Moreover, at least where children are involved, this 
off-base housing might be partially financed by the abuser through a state 
support order.103 If the soldier violates a restraining or support order, he 
should be subjected to sanctions deemed appropriate by the state court104 that 
issued the order. 105 
100. For example, domestic violence cases would be distinguished from instances where a federal 
interest in completing a military mission trumps other interests, such as in Laine v. Weinberger, 541 F. Supp. 
599, 604 (1982) (concerned citizens seeking to enjoin nuclear weapons storage on naval weapons station 
denied relief on grounds that "a State is powerless to condition the means by which the Federal Government 
carries out its activities"). Moreover, the proposed approach, focused as it is on domestic violence, does 
not scrape against much of the extreme in enclave case law--case law firmly maintaining the concept of 
"a state within a state" and allowing federal policy to completely displace state law. See, e.g., United States 
v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363 ( 1 973), on remand, 378 F. Supp. 558 (S.D. Miss. 1974), rev'd, 
421 U.S. 599 (1975) (state tax and regulatory schemes attempting to reach liquor sales on federal enclaves 
defeated); see also Lord v. Local Union No. 2088, 646 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 198 1), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 
1106 ( 1982) (federal policy in favor of union security clauses in language of National Labor Relations Act, 
requiring all workers to be members of union, displaced state law); United States v. Texas, 695 F.2d 136 
(5th Cir. 1983) (Navy defeating Texas' efforts to stop out-of-state liquor sellers from selling directly to 
Navy; Navy efforts to procure liquor at lowest price possible consistent with Department of Defense policy). 
101. The United States has conceded that federal enclaves are not foreign entities but are elements of 
the state in which they are located-permitting state courts to apply state laws until that permission is 
withdrawn. See Offutt Housing Co. v. Sarpy County, 3 5 1  U.S. 253, 260-61 (1956) (allowing state taxation 
of military housing); see also Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 ( 1 972) (treating residents of federal enclave 
as state residents for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment protection). The position taken throughout this 
Note is that, in the area of domestic violence where federal courts and federal legislatures have declined 
to extend jurisdiction, permission given to state courts to apply state laws should not be withdrawn and the 
recourse it offers should be guaranteed. 
102. A "reasonable time" standard could be adopted to limit abuse of the alternative housing option. 
103. "Federal law also authorius involuntary allotments from military pay (42 U.S.C. § 665 (1982)] 
and garnishment of military and retired pay (42 U.S.C. § 659 (1982)] to enforce state child support and 
alimony orders." Arquilla, supra note 53, at 9. 
104. Due to federal court refusal to assert jurisdiction for various reasons, state courts are the issuers 
of such orders for private disputes. See supra notes 4, 44. 
105. Although carrying out abuse prevention orders is left to the discretion of commanders, state courts 
do retain the remedial powers of civil and criminal contempt. The residents of military bases, just as persons 
residing in other states or foreign countries, should be no more immune from judgments of contempt than 
civilians. In support of this proposition, see Kennedy v. Kennedy, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 559, 563, 481 N.E.2d 
1172 (1985) (attachment of United States military pay and pension as remedy for contempt). Moreover, 
at least where there are restraining order statutes such as Massachusetts' MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, 
§ 
7 (West 1987), which provides that violations of abuse orders are criminally punishable, restraining order 
